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THE CASE FOR OVERTURNING WILLIAMS v. FLORIDA AND
THE SIX-PERSON JURY: HISTORY, LAW, AND
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
Alisa Smith*
Michael J. Saks**
After 700 years of common-law history and nearly 200 years of
constitutional history, the Supreme Court concluded that the
constitutionally permissible minimum jury size could not be inferred from
the language or the history of the Constitution. The answer, said the Court
in Williams v. Florida, could be found only through a “functional analysis”
of the performance of smaller juries (that is, empirical examination of the
behavior of different-sized juries). The Court implicitly abandoned that
analysis in Ballew v. Georgia, when it held that juries with fewer than six
members were unconstitutional—a decision based on nothing more than
the ipse dixit of the Justices. This Essay sets out the historical and
empirical infirmities of the Williams line of cases. It summarizes the jury
sizes required in criminal prosecutions throughout the United States;
examines the Sixth Amendment history of the jury trial; argues that this
history supports the position that the Constitution intended twelve-person
juries; reviews Florida’s jury trial history; and summarizes the empirical
research undertaken since Williams. This Essay concludes that at present
no sound basis exists in law for knowing the minimum size of a
constitutionally permissible jury. Williams, having become a dead letter in
Ballew, should either be ratified (and the theory of functional equivalence
applied conscientiously) or be formally reversed to allow courts either to
develop a sound theory of the constitutionality of jury size or to restore the
jury to its traditional size.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Only two states—Florida and Connecticut—rely on six-person juries
in serious felony prosecutions. The constitutionality of Florida’s sixperson jury rests exclusively on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in
Williams v. Florida.1 In Williams, the Court dismissed precedent and legal
tradition, and found the twelve-person jury to be nothing more than a
“historical accident.”2 The Court therefore upheld the constitutionality of
six-person juries because it found six- and twelve-person juries to be
functionally equivalent.3
The Williams Court’s historical analysis is flawed: more thorough
inquiry suggests that the Framers understood and intended the jury to be
a group of twelve persons. But, even accepting the Court’s “functional”
analysis as the correct test of constitutionality, the six-person jury
fails—the empirical evidence never supported the speculations in

1. 399 U.S. 78 (1970); see also Blair v. State, 698 So. 2d 1210, 1216 (Fla. 1997) (stating
that it is indisputable that a person in Florida has a right to a six-person jury); Rinaldo v. State, 861
So. 2d 510, 511 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (holding that a person does not have a fundamental right to
a twelve-person jury); Smith v. State, 857 So. 2d 268, 270 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (holding that a right
to a jury of at least six members is fundamental).
2. Williams, 399 U.S. at 101–02.
3. Id. at 103.
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Williams, and subsequently accumulated knowledge leads to the
conclusion that the performance of the six-person jury is inferior to that of
the twelve-person jury.
This Essay sets out the historical and empirical infirmities of the
Williams decision. Part II presents a summary of the number of jurors used
in criminal prosecutions throughout the United States. Part III examines
the Sixth Amendment history of the trial by jury and argues that the
twelve-person jury was no accident. Part IV provides an overview of
Florida’s jury trial history. Part V describes the Williams Court’s
functional-equivalence test in detail. Part VI summarizes the empirical
research undertaken since Williams, casting great doubt on the vitality of
its holding.
II. THE CURRENT STATUS OF JURIES NATIONWIDE
Although some states reduced the size of the jury in criminal
prosecutions to six persons (and Georgia attempted to reduce the size to
five) following the Williams decision, most states currently retain twelveperson juries in felony cases. Only six states permit juries of fewer than
twelve in felony prosecutions, and of those only four permit six-person
juries.4 Indiana requires twelve-person juries for class A, B, and C
felonies, and six-person juries in all other felony cases.5 Massachusetts
provides twelve-person juries for all Superior Court cases and a de novo
jury trial for all cases appealed from a guilty verdict by a six-person jury
in district court cases. Thus no person accused of a felony in
Massachusetts must settle for a six-person jury. Arizona provides twelveperson juries in cases where the sentence may be more than thirty years
and eight-person juries in other felony cases. In Utah, eight-person juries
are permitted in felony prosecutions. The only other state with six-person
juries in felony cases is Connecticut. All other state and federal felony
prosecutions require twelve-person juries.6 The states that have the death
penalty, including Florida, require twelve-person juries in all capital or
death cases.7

4. DAVID B. ROTTMAN & SHAUNA M. STRICKLAND, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATE COURT
ORGANIZATION 2004, at 233 tbl.42 (2006), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/sco
04.pdf.
5. Id. Indiana has a fixed sentencing structure. Class A felonies are punishable by up to
thirty years in prison, class B by up to ten years in prison, class C by up to four years in prison, and
class D by up to eighteen months in prison. See IND. CODE §§ 35-50-2-4 to -7 (2007).
6. ROTTMAN & STRICKLAND, supra note 4, at 233 tbl.42.
7. Id. In Florida, a defendant may waive a twelve-person jury and agree to be tried by a
smaller jury. See State v. Griffith, 561 So. 2d 528, 529 (Fla. 1990).
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The American Bar Association’s (ABA) principles for jury trials call
for states to provide twelve-person juries in felony prosecutions “if a
penalty of confinement for more than six months may be imposed upon
conviction.”8 Despite the ABA’s recommendation and the near nationwide
consensus on twelve-person juries in serious cases, Florida and
Connecticut retain the six-person jury.
III. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT AND THE HISTORY OF THE JURY
The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees defendants
the right to trial by jury:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel
for his defence.9
The right to trial by jury is essential to freedom and justice:
“Throughout history, the right to a trial by jury has been viewed by our
founding fathers, the framers of our constitution, and all citizens of the
United States since its inception, as essential to the freedoms that make our
society great.”10 The Sixth Amendment, founded on long experience in
English history and the Magna Carta, was included in the Bill of Rights to
“prevent oppression by the government.”11 Blackstone’s Commentaries,
originally published in 1765–1769, identified trials by twelve jurors as
being important to preventing government oppression: “‘[T]he truth of
every accusation, whether preferred in the shape of indictment,
information, or appeal, should afterwards be confirmed by the unanimous
suffrage of twelve of his equals and neighbours, indifferently chosen and
superior to all suspicion.’”12 Blackstone’s summary of the development of

8. A.B.A., AM. JURY PROJECT, PRINCIPLES FOR JURIES AND JURY TRIALS 5 princ.3 (2005),
available at http://www.abanet.org/juryprojectstandards/principles.pdf.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
10. Michael Sudman, Note, The Jury Trial: History, Jury Selection, and the Use of
Demonstrative Evidence, 1 J. LEGAL ADVOC. & PRAC. 172, 173 (1999).
11. Id. at 175; see also Benjamin F. Diamond, Note, The Sixth Amendment: Where Did the
Jury Go? Florida’s Flawed Sentencing in Death Penalty Cases, 55 FLA. L. REV. 905, 909–11
(2003) (discussing the development of the English jury and its influence on the American jury).
12. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 151–52 (1968) (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4
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English law and practice reflects the same history that led the U.S.
Supreme Court in 1898 to determine that the term “jury” in the Sixth
Amendment retained its meaning under the common law and Magna
Carta:
It must consequently be taken that the word “jury” and the
words “trial by jury” were placed in the constitution of the
United States with reference to the meaning affixed to them
in the law as it was in this country and in England at the time
of the adoption of that instrument; and that . . . the supreme
law of the land required that [the defendant] should be tried
by a jury composed of not less than twelve persons.13
The Court, thereafter, consistently held that criminal trials required
twelve-person juries. In 1905, this was true for petty offenses as well. In
Rassmussen v. United States,14 the Court struck down as unconstitutional
an Alaskan territorial law of Congress because the law permitted sixperson juries in misdemeanor cases.15 In 1968, the Court in Duncan v.
Louisiana16 applied the Sixth Amendment to the states, holding that state
criminal prosecutions of non-petty offenses required twelve-person
juries.17
Justice White, writing for a seven-member majority in Duncan, held
trial by jury in criminal cases to be fundamental to the American scheme
of justice and applied this guarantee to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.18 A crime punishable by two years
in prison was not a petty offense and required a jury trial.19 Although the
size of the jury was not at issue in the case, implicit in the opinion was that
juries numbered twelve—the opinion quoted Blackstone on the point.20
The two dissenters specifically challenged the twelve-person requirement,
which they viewed the majority as having embraced.21 But the right to
twelve-person juries was a matter of fundamental principles of liberty and
justice, and was based on well-settled history:

COMMENTARIES *349–50).
13. Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 350 (1898), abrogated by Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S.
78 (1970), and overruled on other grounds by Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 (1990).
14. 197 U.S. 516 (1905).
15. Id. at 518.
16. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
17. Id. at 157–58.
18. Id.
19. See id. at 147.
20. See id. at 151–52.
21. Id. at 182 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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The history of trial by jury in criminal cases has been
frequently told. It is sufficient for present purposes to say that
by the time our Constitution was written, jury trial in criminal
cases had been in existence in England for several centuries
and carried impressive credentials traced by many to Magna
Carta. Its preservation and proper operation as a protection
against arbitrary rule were among the major objectives of the
revolutionary settlement which was expressed in the
Declaration and Bill of Rights of 1689.22
Until Williams, the Court had consistently defined “jury” to mean the
common-law twelve-person jury.23
Florida law allowed six-person juries in non-capital felony cases.24
Following Duncan, the constitutionality of the 1967 version of Florida’s
statute allowing six-person juries was challenged by the petitioner in
Williams, who argued that a six-person jury was inconsistent with the
Sixth Amendment guarantee of trial by jury.25 Because the Sixth
Amendment does not specify a number of impartial jurors for a
constitutional panel, the Williams Court examined whether a twelveperson jury was a necessary ingredient of trial by jury. Although the Court
found that the historical definition of a jury included trial by peers, the
Court characterized the use of twelve-person juries as a “historical
accident” of common law.26 This characterization improperly dispensed
with a 700-year history defining “jury” as comprising twelve persons.
There is “more than sufficient evidence to conclude that the evolution of
the modern jury as a body of twelve-persons was far from accidental.”27
Contrary to the Williams Court’s conclusion, a great deal of commonlaw history—identified in Duncan and previous U.S. Supreme Court and
state law cases—supports an interpretation that the Framers of the
Constitution guaranteed a twelve-person jury through the Sixth
Amendment.28 Trial by jury is fundamental to the common-law system and
predates the adoption of the Sixth Amendment in 1791.29 In fact, the Sixth
22. Id. at 151 (majority opinion) (footnotes omitted).
23. Larry T. Bates, Trial by Jury After Williams v. Florida, 10 HAMLINE L. REV. 53, 55
(1987); Robert H. Miller, Comment, Six of One Is Not a Dozen of the Other: A Reexamination of
Williams v. Florida and the Size of State Criminal Juries, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 621, 621 (1998).
24. See English v. State, 12 So. 689, 690 (Fla. 1893).
25. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 86 (1970).
26. Id. at 89.
27. Miller, supra note 23, at 632–33.
28. See id. at 639–45, 681–82.
29. See generally Richard S. Arnold, Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit, Howard Kaplan Memorial Lecture: Trial by Jury: The Constitutional Right to a Jury of
Twelve in Civil Trials (Oct. 6, 1993), in 22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1 (1993) (noting that it was taken for
granted for hundreds of years that a jury should be composed of twelve people). In a lecture
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Amendment is “essentially redundant” because the right to a trial by jury was
provided in Article III, § 2 of the Constitution in 1789.30 The right to a jury
trial is the “only guarantee to appear in both the original document and the
Bill of Rights.”31
At the Constitutional Convention, the desirability of
safeguarding the jury may have been the most consistent point
of agreement between the Federalists and Anti-Federalists.
Alexander Hamilton wrote in Federalist 83:
The friends and adversaries of the plan of the
convention, if they agree in nothing else, concur at least
in the value they set upon the trial by jury; or if there is
any difference between them it consists in this: the
former regard it as a valuable safeguard to liberty, the
latter represent it as the very palladium of free
government.32
The jury trial’s historical basis is well settled, and the number of jurors was
a deliberate decision based on intrinsic value and not simply a “historical
accident.”33 The number of jurors at the time of adoption—and for centuries
of common-law history preceding the Sixth Amendment—was set at twelve.
When our forefathers spoke of the “trial by jury,” they assumed, based on
“common-law criminal jurisprudence[,] that the ‘truth of every accusation’
against a defendant ‘should afterwards be confirmed by the unanimous
suffrage of twelve of his equals and neighbours.’”34 In Blakely v.
Washington,35 Justice Scalia rejected the argument that the Framers of the
Constitution “left definition of the scope of jury power up to judges’ intuitive
sense of how far is too far.”36 The role of the jury was not left to the
government: “We think that claim not plausible at all, because the very

delivered at the Hofstra University School of Law and later printed in the Hofstra Law Review,
Judge Arnold set forth a compelling historical and empirical argument critical of the six-person jury
in civil cases. See id. His arguments are applicable to criminal trials as well.
30. Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury in the
United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867, 869–70 (1994).
31. Id. at 870. The Constitution and the Sixth Amendment both guarantee the right to a trial
in the state where the crime has been committed. See U.S. CONST . art. 3, § 2, cl. 3; U.S. CONST.
amend. VI.
32. Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 30, at 871 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 499
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
33. See id. at 869–71.
34. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301 (2004) (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4
COMMENTARIES *349–50).
35. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
36. Id. at 308.
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reason the Framers put a jury-trial guarantee in the Constitution is that they
were unwilling to trust government to mark out the role of the jury.”37
Allowing the government to define the size of a jury empowers the
government to all but eliminate the jury, undoing by statute what had been
established by the Constitution. In Ballew v. Georgia,38 the Court
acknowledged this slippery slope by holding that Georgia’s five-person jury
in criminal cases violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.39
Since Williams, the Supreme Court has not directly confronted a
challenge to the six-person jury. In Ballew, the Court was asked to examine
whether five-person juries satisfied the Sixth Amendment guarantee of trial
by jury. Although the Ballew Court reaffirmed Williams, the issue in Ballew
did not concern the constitutionality of six-person juries. The Court, in two
other cases dealing with juries, was also not confronted by a direct challenge
to the infirmity of its Williams decision. In Burch v. Louisiana,40 the Court
held that a non-unanimous verdict by a six-person jury in a state criminal trial
for a non-petty offense violated the Sixth Amendment,41 and in Brown v.
Louisiana,42 the Court gave the decision in Burch retroactive effect.43 The
foundation for twelve-person juries was well rooted in American
jurisprudence prior to the Williams decision. Throughout 700 years of
common-law jurisprudence, no historical evidence supports juries of numbers
other than twelve.
To argue that strictly adhering to the Framer’s view would require the
twelve jurors to be white, male landholders avails nothing. At the time the
Constitution and Bill of Rights were adopted, the qualifications of jurors were
matters of state and federal legislation. Many of the disqualifying
characteristics that limited jury participation to white, male property owners
resulted from the “citizenship” restrictions at that time.44 Discriminatory
practices that restricted juror participation were circumscribed and later
eliminated after the passage of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments:
The years following the Civil War saw four notable legal
developments that affected the criminal jury. In 1868, the
Fourteenth Amendment declared that no state could enact or
enforce any law abridging the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States. The amendment also forbade any
state to deny to any person the equal protection of the laws.
Two years later, the Fifteenth Amendment declared that “the
right [of citizens of the United States] to vote shall not be

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id.
435 U.S. 223 (1978).
Id. at 230–31.
441 U.S. 130 (1979) (a unanimity case).
Id. at 139.
447 U.S. 323 (1980) (a unanimity case).
Id. at 331.
See Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 30, at 877–78.
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[denied or] abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.” The
Federal Civil Rights Act of 1875 provided that “no
citizen . . . shall be disqualified for service as a grand or petit
juror in any court of the United States, or of any State on
account of race.” And four years later, the Federal Jury
Selection Act of 1879 reversed the course of earlier
congressional action, facilitated discriminatory jury selection in
the federal courts, and brought Reconstruction in the jury box
to an end.45
The Supreme Court has held that racial or gender discrimination in jury
selection violates the Fourteenth Amendment.46 The historical interpretation
of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a jury of twelve would not require
those twelve individuals be propertied white men.47
English history and common-law precedent should not be easily
dismissed. History and precedent remain important cornerstones to
constitutional interpretation as evidenced by three recent Supreme Court
decisions: two identifying the primary role of the jury, and not the judge,
in making findings of fact,48 and one identifying the right of defendants to
confront witnesses under the Sixth Amendment.49 Relying heavily on
history, the Court held that the jury, not the judge, should make findings
of fact and that evidentiary rules introducing hearsay violated the right of
confrontation. In Jones v. United States,50 the Court specifically described
the historical importance of trial by jury:
Identifying trial by jury as “the grand bulwark” of English
liberties, Blackstone contended that other liberties would
remain secure only “so long as this palladium remains sacred
and inviolate, not only from all open attacks, (which none
will be so hardy as to make) but also from all secret
machinations, which may sap and undermine it; by
introducing new and arbitrary methods of trial, by justices of

45. Id. at 887 (third alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend.
XV, § 1, and Federal Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, § 4, 18 Stat. 335, 336 (current version at
18 U.S.C. § 243 (2000))).
46. J.E.B v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.
79, 89 (1986).
47. Cf. Arnold, supra note 29, at 33 (noting that changing times justify the progression away
from some characteristics of the juries of 1791—such as that jurors be white men owning real
property—but may not justify decreasing from twelve to six jurors).
48. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 588–89 (2002); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,
478–79 (2000).
49. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42 (2004).
50. 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
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the peace, commissioners of the revenue, and courts of
conscience. And however convenient these may appear at
first, (as doubtless all arbitrary powers, well executed, are the
most convenient ), yet let it be again remembered, that delays,
and little inconveniences in the forms of justice, are the price
that all free nations must pay for their liberty in more
substantial matters.”51
IV. THE FLORIDA JURY
Article 1, § 22 of the Florida Constitution provides: “The right of trial
by jury shall be secure to all and remain inviolate. The qualifications and
the number of jurors, not fewer than six, shall be fixed by law.”52 Florida
Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.270 and § 913.10 of the Florida Statutes
require twelve-person juries “to try all capital cases” and six-person juries
“to try all other criminal cases.”53 In Florida, the right to a six-person jury
is a fundamental, state constitutional right, and a twelve-person jury in
capital cases is merely a matter of statutory law.
Because the Sixth Amendment was not incorporated by the Fourteenth
Amendment to apply to the states until 1968,54 Florida’s history of the jury
trial guarantee under the state constitution is discussed separately. The
Florida Constitution of 1875 adopted the principle that “‘[g]rand and petit
jurors shall be taken from the registered voters of the respective counties.
The number of jurors for the trial of causes in any court may be fixed by
law.’”55 In 1877, the legislature passed a law stating that “‘twelve men
shall constitute a jury to try all capital cases, and six men shall constitute
a jury to try all other offences prosecuted by indictment, presentment, or
information.’”56 In 1877, the Florida Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the legislation regulating juries, reasoning as follows:
“An examination of the legislation shows that the number of jurors has
been regulated by law, and that six persons are made sufficient in many of
the States under similar constitutional provisions or under statutes, and
these regulations have been sustained by the courts.”57
51. Id. at 246 (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *350).
52. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 22.
53. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.270; FLA. STAT. § 913.10 (2007).
54. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149–50 (1968).
55. Gibson v. State, 16 Fla. 291, 300 (1877) (quoting FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. VI, § 12
(1875)). Legislative history and records for acts and bills passed before 1969 are not available.
Legislative Research at the Florida State Archives, http://dlis.dos.state.fl.us/
barm/fsa/legislativeresearch.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2008).
56. Gibson, 16 Fla. at 297–98 (quoting Law of Feb. 17, 1877, ch. 3010, § 6, at 54 (repealed
1892)).
57. Id. at 300. In Gibson, the court did not cite the state law, constitutional provisions, or
cases to support its reasoning. Although there is some doubt that many states reduced the number
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In 1885, § 38 of Article 5 of the Florida Constitution was amended:
“‘The number of jurors for the trial of causes in any court may be fixed by
law but shall not be less than six in any case.’”58 No early opinions
interpreted the twelve-person jury requirement in capital cases. In Adams
v. State,59 however, the Florida Supreme Court confronted a constitutional
challenge to a jury of less than twelve in a non-capital murder case.60
Adams was originally charged with capital murder. In his first trial, he was
acquitted of first-degree murder and convicted of second-degree murder.61
His conviction was reversed, and he was retried and convicted of seconddegree murder by a jury of six. Adams argued that his conviction was
unconstitutional because he was granted only a six-person as opposed to
a twelve-person jury.62 The Florida Supreme Court defined a “capital case”
as “a case in which a person is tried for a capital crime.”63 According to the
court, “A capital crime is one for which the punishment of death is
inflicted.”64 Because Adams was convicted of murder in the second
degree, which is punishable by imprisonment for life, the court held that
he was not convicted of a capital crime and that he was not entitled to a
jury of twelve.65 Neither the Adams court nor any other precedent or
legislative history explains why Florida retains twelve-person juries in
capital cases.
After the Williams decision but before Ballew, the Florida Supreme
Court adopted a revision to Rule 3.270 reaffirming § 913.10 of the 1968
Florida Statutes, which permitted six-person juries to try criminal cases.66
Florida courts have consistently held that the right to six-person juries is

of jurors in criminal cases, there is little documented history, during the 200 years following the
adoption of the Bill of Rights, on the criminal jury trial. See Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 30, at
867–68. There is, however, some historical evidence that the courts, particularly in the South,
“def[ied] the rule of law, particularly federal constitutional law.” Stephen B. Bright, Can Judicial
Independence Be Attained in the South? Overcoming History, Elections, and Misperceptions About
the Role of the Judiciary, 14 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 817, 817 (1998). In their defiance, state courts may
have reduced the number of jurors in contravention of common law and the Sixth Amendment.
58. English v. State, 12 So. 689, 690 (Fla. 1893) (quoting FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. V, § 38).
59. 48 So. 219 (Fla. 1908).
60. Id. at 224.
61. Id. at 220.
62. Id. at 224.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. In re Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 272 So. 2d 65, 65 (Fla. 1972). Prior to the
1970 amendment to § 913.10, the statute read: “Twelve men shall constitute a jury to try all capital
cases, and six men shall constitute a jury to try all other criminal cases.” FLA. STAT. § 913.10
(1970).
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“fundamental in nature.”67 In Jordan v. State,68 for example, Jordan’s
conviction was reversed because his jury was selected in an
unconstitutionally discriminatory manner: “[T]he Sixth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution guarantees the accused a trial by an impartial jury. This
comprehends that in the selection process there will be ‘a fair possibility
for obtaining a representative cross-section of the community.’”69
The right to a jury trial is undoubtedly, under Florida law, an
“indispensable component of our system of justice.”70 Following the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decision in Furman v. Georgia,71 which for a time
invalidated capital punishment, several Florida Supreme Court cases
confronted the number-of-jurors issue in pending capital cases. In
Donaldson v. Sack,72 the Florida Supreme Court decided whether
individuals charged with capital crimes were still entitled to twelve-person
juries.73 The Donaldson court held that portions of the rule and statute
concerning capital offenses that required twelve-person juries in capital
cases were no longer applicable.74 Capital cases were to be tried with sixperson juries under the Florida Constitution.75
More recently, however, the Florida Supreme Court held that unless the
defendant agreed to a six-person jury, a twelve-person jury was required
in first-degree murder cases when the maximum penalty was life
imprisonment.76 Contrarily, in Hall v. State,77 the First District Court of
Appeal held that it was not error to deny a twelve-person jury to Hall when
death was not a possible punishment. In Hall, the First District certified as
a matter of great public importance the following question: “Whether a 12person jury is required in a first degree murder case where the death
penalty may not be imposed as a matter of law.”78 The Florida Supreme
Court denied review, leaving this question unanswered.79

67. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 857 So. 2d 268, 270 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003).
68. 293 So. 2d 131 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974).
69. Id. at 134 (quoting Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970)).
70. Blair v. State, 698 So. 2d 1210, 1213 (Fla. 1997).
71. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
72. 265 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1972).
73. Id. at 503.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See State v. Griffith, 561 So. 2d 528, 529 (Fla. 1990).
77. 853 So. 2d 546 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003).
78. Id. at 549.
79. See Hall v. State, 865 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 2003). Likewise, denial of post-conviction relief
was affirmed by Hall v. State, 915 So. 2d 1199 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005), and habeas corpus denied by
Hall v. McDonough, No. 5:06cv30/RS, 2006 WL 2425519, at *1 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 21, 2006).
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In Florida, sexual battery of a person under age twelve by a person over
eighteen is a capital offense.80 These capital sexual battery cases are tried
by six-person rather than twelve-person juries because death is not a
possible penalty.81 In two recent cases, however, Justice Pariente and
Judge Altenbernd of the Second District Court of Appeal raised questions
about requiring twelve-person juries in cases where life in prison without
the possibility of parole is a possible sentence.82 In Palazzolo v. State,83
Judge Altenbernd identified evidentiary proof concerns that may justify
twelve-person juries in non-death cases:
This case [involving capital sexual battery punishable by
life in prison without the possibility of parole] demonstrates
that the evidence in a capital sexual battery trial can often be
much more tenuous than the evidence in a capital homicide
trial. In almost all first-degree murder trials, there is little
question that a murder occurred. In capital sexual battery
cases, the proof that any crime occurred often depends
exclusively upon the testimony of a child of tender years.
There may be merit to a rule of procedure requiring a jury of
twelve in these cases or to a procedural rule allowing the jury
to receive an instruction on the penalty comparable to the
instruction that the legislature attempted to mandate in
section 918.10(1) [of the Florida Statutes]. These are issues,
however, for resolution in the supreme court in its prospective
rule-making capacity.84
In Adaway v. State,85 Justice Pariente expressed similar concerns with the
fairness of six-person juries in serious felony cases:
[I]f capital sexual battery remains a capital felony, I urge this
Court to consider amending Florida Rule of Criminal
Procedure 3.270 to require a jury of twelve in these cases. As
noted in Palazzolo v. State, the evidence in a capital sexual
battery trial can be much more tenuous than in a murder trial,
and often rests largely on the victim’s testimony and hearsay
statements. Unless the defense agrees to a jury of six, a
twelve-person jury is required in first-degree murder cases in

80. FLA. STAT. § 794.011(2)(a) (2007).
81. Hogan v. State, 451 So. 2d 844, 845–46 (Fla. 1984); Hall, 853 So. 2d at 549; Cooper v.
State, 453 So. 2d 67, 67–68 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).
82. Adaway v. State, 902 So. 2d 746, 753, 755 (Fla. 2005) (Pariente, J., concurring);
Palazzolo v. State, 754 So. 2d 731, 736 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000).
83. 754 So. 2d 731 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000).
84. Id. at 737 (citation omitted).
85. 902 So. 2d 746 (Fla. 2005).
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which the maximum penalty is life imprisonment because the
State is not seeking the death penalty.86
Thus, twelve-person juries are viewed as justified by the seriousness of
the penalty and the potential tenuousness of the evidence. In light of these
justifications, most, if not all, felony prosecutions would seem to warrant
twelve-person juries as well. Of additional concern, Florida’s legislature
has adopted numerous enhancement statutes (e.g., prison releasee
reoffender, habitual felony offender, and violent career criminal) that
significantly increase criminal penalties for felony convictions.87 For many
offenses, these enhancement statutes allow, and in some instances require
(e.g., prison releasee reoffender), very long sentences, including life in
prison without parole. In addition to capital sexual battery cases, many
felony prosecutions rely exclusively on victim testimony (e.g., rape and
robbery cases) where the evidence may be more tenuous than in a
prosecution of capital murder.
These most recent discussions by the Florida courts have raised
concerns about the fairness of six-person juries in serious felony
prosecutions. Conspicuously absent, however, is any discussion by the
courts about empirical evidence that compares six-person with twelveperson juries. This comparison, known as the functional-equivalence test,
was adopted by the Williams Court to provide a test for the
constitutionality of juries smaller than twelve. The next Part of this Essay
discusses the Court’s development of this test.
V. THE FUNCTIONAL-EQUIVALENCE TEST
After dismissing history, tradition, and precedent as bases for assessing
the constitutional adequacy of juries with fewer than twelve members, the
U.S. Supreme Court in Williams turned to functional equivalence to
measure constitutionality: “The relevant inquiry, as we see it, must be the
function that the particular feature performs and its relation to the purposes
of the jury trial.”88 The Court considered a number of jury functions and
fashioned a test to determine whether smaller juries performed these
functions as well as the traditional twelve-person juries. If they did not, the
smaller juries lacked what the U.S. Constitution required:
“Providing an accused with the right to be tried by a jury of
his peers gave him an inestimable safeguard against the
corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant,
biased, or eccentric judge.” Given this purpose, the essential
feature of a jury obviously lies in the interposition between
the accused and his accuser of the commonsense judgment of
a group of laymen, and in the community participation and

86. Id. at 755 (Pariente, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
87. See FLA. STAT. § 921.0016(3) (2007).
88. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 99–100 (1970).
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shared responsibility that results from that group’s
determination of guilt or innocence. The performance of this
role is not a function of the particular number of the body that
makes up the jury. To be sure, the number should probably be
large enough to promote group deliberation, free from
outside attempts at intimidation, and to provide a fair
possibility for obtaining a representative cross-section of the
community.89
According to the Court’s Sixth Amendment assessment, twelve- and sixperson juries were functionally equivalent, and the twelve-person
requirement could not “be regarded as an indispensable component of the
Sixth Amendment.”90
The Williams Court found that to satisfy the purpose of trial by jury, a
smaller jury must accomplish the following goals as well as a twelveperson jury: foster effective group deliberations; produce accurate factfinding; reduce the risk of convicting an innocent defendant; provide
consistency and reliability in the criminal justice system; provide an
adequate hearing of minority viewpoints; and represent a cross-section of
the community. The Court concluded that in all of these ways the sixperson jury was the functional equivalent of the twelve-person jury.91
What was the Williams Court’s basis for this conclusion? One would
think that eliminating what until then had been regarded as a constitutional
right—a jury of twelve—and substituting a jury of six would require proof
that functional equivalence actually existed. Instead, the Court relied upon,
as one eminent empirical legal scholar put it, “scant evidence by any
standards.”92 The Court relied on (1) what it claimed were empirical
studies (specifically: “experiments”)93 but which were not empirical
studies at all; (2) actual studies, the findings of which the Court read
exactly backwards; and (3) its own speculation.
To support its assertion that the outcomes of trials would not differ as
a function of the size of the jury, the Court cited six “experiments” and
asserted: “What few experiments have occurred—usually in the civil
area—indicate that there is no discernible difference between the results
reached by the two different-sized juries.”94 Not one of these

89. Id. at 100 (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145, 156 (1968)).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 101–02.
92. Hans Zeisel, . . . And Then There Were None: The Diminution of the Federal Jury, 38 U.
CHI. L. REV. 710, 715 (1971).
93. Williams, 399 U.S. at 101.
94. Id. at 101 & n.48.
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“experiments” provided any evidence on the question at hand. The Phillips
article was irrelevant because it addressed only the possible financial
savings associated with reducing jury size95 but not any of the criteria upon
which the Court had determined constitutionality depended. Wiehl merely
cited96 Joiner who, on the basis of nothing but his own speculation, had
stated that “it could easily be argued that a six-man jury would deliberate
equally as well as one of twelve.”97 The Bulletin of the Section of Judicial
Administration of the American Bar Association simply reported that a test
of six-person juries in Monmouth County, New Jersey, was being
planned.98 Judge Tamm reported that he had presided over many
condemnation trials using five-man juries and (without providing any data
or any analysis) said that he had perceived no differences.99 Cronin
reported on the use of six-person juries in forty-three civil cases in the
state district court in Worcester, Massachusetts (where, incidentally,
unhappy litigants had the right to a second trial, de novo, in front of twelve
jurors in the Superior Court).100 Cronin spoke to a court clerk and three
attorneys involved in trials in the district court, and these four persons said
that the smaller juries seemed to behave the same as larger juries.101
Beyond these bare assertions there were no data and no analysis. Finally,
the Court relied upon an article in the Journal of the American Judicature
Society that summarized the previous experience—namely, the
impressions of three lawyers and a clerk.102
On the question whether jurors in the minority were less able to resist
conformity pressure from the majority in six-person juries than in twelveperson juries, the Court cited several empirical studies. Relying on these
studies, the Court concluded that the critical factor was the ratio of
majority to minority members, which would not change merely by cutting
the jury size in half: “Studies of the operative factors contributing to small
group deliberation and decisionmaking suggest that jurors in the minority
on the first ballot are likely to be influenced by the proportional size of the
95. See Hon. Richard H. Phillips, A Jury of Six in All Cases, 30 CONN. B.J. 354, 356–58
(1956).
96. Hon. Lloyd L. Wiehl, The Six Man Jury, 4 GONZ. L. REV. 35, 38–39 (1968).
97. CHARLES W. JOINER, CIVIL JUSTICE AND THE JURY 83 (1962) (concluding that the
deliberative process should be the same in either the six- or twelve-person jury).
98. New Jersey Experiments with Six-Man Jury, BULL. SEC. JUD. ADMIN. A.B.A., May 1966,
at 9, 9.
99. Edward A. Tamm, The Five-Man Civil Jury: A Proposed Constitutional Amendment, 51
GEO. L.J. 120, 136–38 (1962).
100. Phillip M. Cronin, Six-Member Juries in District Courts, BOSTON B.J., Apr. 1958, at 27,
27–29.
101. Id. at 27–28.
102. Six-Member Juries Tried in Massachusetts District Court, 42 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y
136, 136 (1958).
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majority aligned against them.”103 Thus, a minority faction in a jury
divided 10–2 would be no better able to withstand majority influence than
the minority faction in a jury divided 5–1. The critical factor, said the
Court, was the proportion, not the absolute number, of jurors in the
factions. But the empirical studies found exactly the opposite. To quote
from those sources on the very pages to which the Court cited:
• [F]or one or two jurors to hold out to the end, it would
appear necessary that they had companionship at the
beginning of the deliberations. The juror psychology
recalls a famous series of experiments by the psychologist
Asch and others which showed that in an ambiguous
situation a member of a group will doubt and finally
disbelieve his own correct observation if all other
members of the group claim that he must have been
mistaken. To maintain his original position, not only
before others but even before himself, it is necessary for
him to have at least one ally.104
• The results clearly demonstrate that a disturbance of the
unanimity of the majority markedly increased the
independence of the critical subjects. . . . Indeed, we have
been able to show that a unanimous majority of 3 is, under
the given conditions, far more effective than a majority of
8 containing 1 dissenter.105
• Participants in a discussion are often influenced to change
their opinion simply by the knowledge that an
overwhelming majority disagrees with them. Consistent
disapproval by the majority can shake a small minority’s
faith even in judgments it believes to be right. Such
pressures are most effective against a single dissenter and
fall off rapidly in efficacy as the size of the dissenting
coalition increases. A single ally gives most dissenters the
courage to voice their true convictions.106
On the question whether smaller juries would less adequately represent
a cross-section of the community, the Court offered nothing more than its

103. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 101 n.49 (1970).
104. HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 463 (1966).
105. S.E. Asch, Effects of Group Pressure upon the Modification and Distortion of Judgments,
in READINGS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 2, 8 (Guy E. Swanson, Theodore M. Newcomb & Eugene
L. Hartley et al. eds., rev. ed. 1952).
106. Note, On Instructing Deadlocked Juries, 78 YALE L.J. 100, 110 (1968) (footnotes
omitted).
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own speculation:
[W]hile in theory the number of viewpoints represented on a
randomly selected jury ought to increase as the size of the
jury increases, in practice the difference between the 12-man
and the six-man jury in terms of the cross-section of the
community represented seems likely to be
negligible. . . . [T]he concern that the cross-section will be
significantly diminished if the jury is decreased in size from
12 to six seems an unrealistic one.107
The Court would have needed to go no further than an undergraduate
statistics textbook to learn something about principles of statistical
sampling that could have displaced the Justices’ collective intuition. The
Court might then have better considered the impact of any given sample
size when drawing samples from populations of any given stratification
(such as the proportion of a racial minority, of libertarians, or of certain
age or education groups). For example, adopting the Court’s randomsampling model, we can learn that one or more members of a minority that
constituted 10% of the population would be expected to appear in 72% of
twelve-member juries but in only 47% of six-member juries. As Hans
Zeisel commented on such an effect: “It is clear, then, that however limited
a twelve-member jury is in representing the full spectrum of the
community, the six-member jury is even more limited, and not by a
‘negligible’ margin.”108
The Williams Court’s remarkably inadequate and erroneous analysis
has been the subject of comment by scholars in a multitude of
fields—statistics, psychology, sociology, and political science, as well as
law.109 Moreover, the lead opinion in Ballew v. Georgia110 acknowledged
the failing of the Williams Court’s analysis.
In Colgrove v. Battin,111 the Supreme Court revisited the question of
jury size effects and constitutionality in the context of federal civil trials.
Colgrove cited four empirical studies,112 three of which were conducted by
researchers who realized that no research actually existed to support the
Williams Court’s conclusions. The fourth reported the findings of a study
that the Williams Court had cited to support its conclusion even though
107. Williams, 399 U.S. at 102.
108. Zeisel, supra note 92, at 716.
109. See, e.g., Michael Saks, Ignorance of Science Is No Excuse, TRIAL, Nov.–Dec. 1974, at
18, reprinted in JOHN MONAHAN & LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW 254 (5th ed.
2002).
110. 435 U.S. 223, 231–32 (1978); see also infra notes 121–31 and accompanying text.
111. 413 U.S. 149 (1973).
112. Id. at 160.
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that study did not yet actually exist.113 In citing these new studies, the
Court implicitly conceded the weakness of its Williams opinion. The new
studies on which the Colgrove Court relied suffer from serious
methodological weaknesses, which have been thoroughly explicated in the
literature.114 The Colgrove Court nevertheless relied on the studies to
affirm its earlier factual conclusions.115
Ballew once again revisited the question of jury size, this time in the
context of a state testing how small the U.S. Constitution would allow
juries to shrink. In his opinion announcing the Court’s unanimous holding
that juries smaller than six were not constitutional, Justice Blackmun
thoroughly canvassed the research literature as of that date.116
In Williams, the Court determined that “the reliability of the jury as a
factfinder hardly seems likely to be a function of its size.”117 But in Ballew,
the Court implicitly conceded that size does matter. The Ballew Court
unanimously held that a reduction from six to five jurors was
constitutionally unacceptable and that with such juries “the purpose and
functioning of the jury in a criminal trial is seriously impaired, and to a
constitutional degree.”118 One has to wonder how it could be that
eliminating six jurors (from twelve members to six) makes no difference
while eliminating one more (from six to five) triggers unanimous concern.
In analyzing whether five jurors were constitutionally sufficient, Justice
Blackmun’s lead opinion in Ballew partially summarized Williams’s
holding that the Sixth Amendment “mandated a jury only of sufficient size
to promote group deliberation, to insulate members from outside
intimidation, and to provide a representative cross-section of the
community.”119 The Court used the twelve-person jury as a benchmark of
those functions: if smaller-sized juries performed equally well then they
were functionally equivalent to twelve-person juries and therefore were
constitutional. If the Justices—who unanimously held in Ballew that juries
smaller than six were deficient—were being true to the Court’s Williams

113. Id. The Williams Court cited a mere announcement that the study was in the planning
stages.
114. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. SAKS, JURY VERDICTS: THE ROLE OF GROUP SIZE AND SOCIAL
DECISION RULE 37–49 (1977); Shari Seidman Diamond, A Jury Experiment Reanalyzed, 7 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 520 (1974); Hans Zeisel & Shari Seidman Diamond, “Convincing Empirical
Evidence” on the Six Member Jury, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 283–90 (1974).
115. Colgrove, 413 U.S. at 160 n.15. All four of these studies are included in the meta-analysis
relied upon in Part VI below, where they are weighted to appropriately reflect their relative
methodological weaknesses.
116. 435 U.S. 223, 243–45 (1978).
117. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100–01 (1970).
118. Ballew, 435 U.S. at 239.
119. Id. at 230.
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analysis, they would have asked themselves whether five-person juries
failed to perform as well as twelve-person juries. They had no studies
addressing that question. What they had, and what Justice Blackmun’s
opinion reviewed, were numerous studies of the differences in the
performance of six-person juries compared to twelve-person juries.120 The
deficiencies in smaller juries revealed by those studies spoke almost
exclusively to the validity of six-person, not five-person, juries.
Justice Blackmun’s review of the research came to conclusions quite
at odds with the conclusions in Williams. His opinion acknowledged,
among other matters, that as juries grew smaller, important aspects of the
quality of deliberation declined,121 accuracy of results suffered,122 and
cross-sectional representation of the community was adversely affected.123
Justice Blackmun’s opinion found that the available data showed the
following:
[T]he purpose and functioning of the jury in a criminal trial
is seriously impaired, and to a constitutional degree, by a
reduction in size to below six members. We readily admit that
we do not pretend to discern a clear line between six
members and five. But the assembled data raise substantial
doubt about the reliability and appropriate representation of
panels smaller than six. Because of the fundamental

120. Id. at 231 n.10. The Court listed the numerous studies and other articles that were
published between 1970 and 1978 on the subject of the effects of different jury sizes. Virtually all
of the studies focused on the contrast between six- and twelve-person groups. The opinion also
explained the deficiencies of the studies relied upon by the Court in Williams and Colgrove. See
id. at 237–39.
121. “[R]ecent empirical data suggest that progressively smaller juries are less likely to foster
effective group deliberations. At some point, this decline leads to inaccurate fact-finding and
incorrect application of the common sense of the community to the facts.” Id. at 232.
122. “[T]he data now raise doubts about the accuracy of the results achieved by smaller and
smaller panels. Statistical studies suggest that the risk of convicting an innocent person . . . rises
as the size of the jury diminishes.” Id. at 234. “[T]he data suggest that the verdicts of jury
deliberation in criminal cases will vary as juries become smaller, and that the variance amounts to
an imbalance to the detriment of one side, the defense.” Id. at 236.
123. The Court found that reduced jury size also reduces the presence of minority
representation on jury panels:
Although the Court in Williams concluded that the six-person jury did not fail to
represent adequately a cross-section of the community, the opportunity for
meaningful and appropriate representation does decrease with the size of the
panels. Thus, if a minority group constitutes 10% of the community, 53.1% of
randomly selected six-member juries could be expected to have no minority
representative among their members, and 89% not to have two.
Id. at 237.
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importance of the jury trial to the American system of
criminal justice, any further reduction that promotes
inaccurate and possibly biased decisionmaking, that causes
untoward differences in verdicts, and that prevents juries
from truly representing their communities, attains
constitutional significance.124
Resolving the tension in Justice Blackmun’s conclusion is impossible:
While we adhere to, and reaffirm our holding in Williams
v. Florida, these studies, most of which have been made since
Williams was decided in 1970, lead us to conclude that the
purpose and functioning of the jury in a criminal trial is
seriously impaired, and to a constitutional degree, by a
reduction in size to below six members.125
“[T]he assembled data raise substantial doubt about the reliability and
appropriate representation of panels smaller than six.”126 Justice Blackmun
was aware of the tensions in his opinion. The bench memo from his clerk
is revealing:
Although it is not conclusive, empirical evidence now
supports 3 propositions contrary to the assumptions of
Williams: a) a jury’s performance may be determined in part
by its size, b) group deliberation . . . is improved by addition
of members, c) the possibility of obtaining a fair cross-section
increases as the size of the jury increases.127
“[T]he assumptions of Williams are probably erroneous . . . .”128 The memo
clearly framed the dilemma: “If the Williams assumptions are not reexamined, then 5 is as constitutional as 6. If the assumptions of Williams
are incorrect, the requirements may need to be modified to be
constitutional.”129 Justice Blackmun was not only unwilling to resolve the
dilemma by overturning an existing precedent (“Williams is on the books,”
he declared in an internal memo130), but he was also unwilling to allow the
124. Id. at 239.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Bench Memorandum to Justice Blackmun, Re: Ballew v. Georgia (Aug. 22, 1977), at 3,
in THE HARRY A. BLACKMUN PAPERS, Supreme Court File, 1918–1999, Box 260, No. 76-761
(Library of Congress).
128. Id. at 15.
129. Id. at 12. We read this as a gentle way of saying that Williams would have to be altered
or simply overturned.
130. Notes of Justice Blackmun (Aug. 29, 1977), in THE HARRY A. BLACKMUN PAPERS, supra
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dissolution of the jury to continue (“I ask [myself] the question of what I
will do when we are next confronted with a 4-man jury, then a 3-, then a
2-, then a 1-”131). His published opinion was his best effort to get the Court
off the slippery slope without overturning Williams.
If Justice Blackmun’s contradictory opinion is an unsatisfying solution,
a worse solution was offered by the seven of his colleagues who agreed
with the holding but did not join in his opinion. These seven could find no
way to stop the slide other than to nakedly assert their judicial will,
expressed most candidly by Justice Powell, who declared peremptorily that
“a line has to be drawn somewhere.”132 They abandoned the reasoning of
Williams and substituted their own arbitrary pronouncement. If for over
700 years their forebears lacked any basis but an intuitive sense that twelve
was the right number of jurors, the Supreme Court succeeded in adhering
to its Williams principles for only eight years before the Justices
themselves abandoned those principles in favor of their own intuitive sense
that the proper number was at least six, even though they found themselves
incapable of coherently explaining why.
If the Court’s approach in Williams was correct, and if Justice
Blackmun’s opinion in Ballew set forth the best knowledge available at the
time, it is worth asking where the facts and the analysis lead. The most
straightforward answer is that, even on its own terms, Williams was
wrongly decided. A number of state courts have recognized this as the
implication of the Ballew opinion. In State v. Hamm,133 the Minnesota
Supreme Court noted that the Ballew Court “made an excellent argument
that could be used to support a 12-person jury.”134 The New Hampshire
Supreme Court, based explicitly on the Ballew opinion, reasoned:
Although Justice Blackmun’s majority opinion in Ballew
expressed these concerns in the context of a decision
regarding a further reduction of criminal trial juries from six
to five, we note that these problems may also arise in the

note 127. Justice Blackmun was loathe to overturn precedent, and no serious discussion of
overturning Williams took place, though that option was raised by his clerk. See supra text
accompanying note 129.
131. Notes of Justice Blackmun, supra note 130.
132. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 246 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring). He was joined by
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Stewart and
Marshall, concurred in the judgment but not the reasoning of the opinion, though he offered no
reasons. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice White wrote separately, concurring in the judgment,
on the unexplained basis that a reduction to five would undermine the cross-section requirement
(thereby contradicting his earlier opinion in Williams). Id. at 245 (White, J., concurring).
133. 423 N.W.2d 379 (Minn. 1988) (holding on state constitutional grounds that the right to
trial by jury implicitly required a twelve-person jury).
134. Id. at 382 n.2.
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context of reducing the size of juries in civil cases from
twelve to six.135
The court advised the New Hampshire Legislature that juries smaller than
twelve were not functionally equivalent and would therefore not satisfy the
requirements of New Hampshire’s constitution.136 Not long after Ballew,
in promulgating a Model Medical Malpractice Act for the states, the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services recommended twelve-person
juries, particularly for their virtue of greater stability and predictability
compared to groups of six persons.137
Since the Ballew decision, further empirical studies have been
conducted that examine differences in decisionmaking and functioning of
six- and twelve-person juries. The whole body of research leads to the
conclusion that six- and twelve-person juries are not functionally
equivalent and thus six-person juries impair the constitutional purpose and
function of the jury.
VI. THE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
This Part summarizes the errors and evidence in relation to each of the
constitutional jury size criteria defined by the Court. The task of reviewing
the research literature is made easier by the meta-analysis of Saks and
Marti,138 which statistically combined and analyzed empirical studies
comparing the performance of six- versus twelve-person juries.139 In all,
those 17 studies involved 2,061 juries consisting of about 15,000

135. Opinion of the Justices, 431 A.2d 135, 136 (N.H. 1981).
136. Id. at 136–37. Several states, including Minnesota, Hamm, 423 N.W.2d at 386, and
Wisconsin, State v. Hansford, 580 N.W.2d 171, 180 (Wis. 1998), have held that their state
constitutions require a twelve-person jury in criminal cases, particularly felonies. In Vermont, a
supreme court committee rejected a reduction in size and maintained its legislatively required
twelve-person juries in all criminal cases. Vt. Supreme Court, Report of the Jury Policy Committee,
http://www.vermontjudiciary.org/Committees/Reports/jurypolicyrpt.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2008).
137. See Michael J. Saks, What Do Jury Experiments Tell Us About How Juries (Should) Make
Decisions?, 6 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 15 n.43 (1997).
138. See generally Michael J. Saks & Mollie Weighner Marti, A Meta-Analysis of the Effects
of Jury Size, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 451 (1997) (reviewing empirical studies to consider the
effects of reducing jury size from twelve to six). A meta-analysis is a method of statistically
combining studies to determine the essential finding of the body of research, the strength of that
effect, and the other variables that interact with and moderate the basic effect. See generally
MORTON HUNT, HOW SCIENCE TAKES STOCK: THE STORY OF META-ANALYSIS (1997) (examining
the history, use, and controversies of meta-analysis); ROBERT ROSENTHAL, META-ANALYTIC
PROCEDURES FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH (rev. ed. 1991) (evaluating general meta-analysis procedures
and results).
139. See Saks & Marti, supra note 138, at 452.
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individual jurors.140 Nine studies analyzed actual juries and eight studies
analyzed experimental mock juries.141
A. Community Representation
On the issue of the ability of different-sized juries to provide a fair
cross-sectional representation of the community, the Williams Court
offered nothing but ipse dixit:
[W]hile in theory the number of viewpoints represented on a
randomly selected jury ought to increase as the size of the
jury increases, in practice the difference between the 12-man
and the six-man jury in terms of the cross-section of the
community represented seems likely to be
negligible. . . . [T]he concern that the cross-section will be
significantly diminished if the jury is decreased in size from
12 to six seems an unrealistic one.142
As we have seen, this assumption conflicts with well-established and
widely recognized statistical principles of sampling.143
Empirical studies confirmed the predictions of statistical theory. Larger
juries were more likely to contain at least one minority group member,
while smaller juries were more likely to have no minority representation
at all. Not one study contradicted this result, which was the single
strongest finding from the meta-analysis.144 Minorities, no matter how they
are defined, are represented in a smaller percentage of six-person as
compared to twelve-person juries.
B. Quality of Group Deliberation
On the issue of whether the amount or quality of group deliberation
was vitiated by reduction in the size of the jury, the Court offered neither
evidence nor reasoning. Instead, the Court merely speculated: “[W]e find
little reason to think that [the goals of quality deliberation] are in any
meaningful sense less likely to be achieved when the jury numbers six,
than when it numbers 12—particularly if the requirement of unanimity is

140. Id.
141. Id. at 453.
142. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 102 (1970).
143. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
144. Saks & Marti, supra note 138, at 457. The difference between smaller and larger juries
in minority group representation on juries of the different sizes was significant at p < .0001. That
means that there is less than 1 chance in 10,000 that the two different-sized juries perform equally
well in this respect.
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retained.”145 Nor did the Court define precisely which dimensions of
deliberation are critically important, though presumably this criterion
relates to the process of the group interaction—in contrast to the product
of decisions, which is a separate criterion.
Studies of jury size effects have examined length of deliberation,
accuracy of collective discussion of case facts during deliberation, and
accuracy of individual recall measured by questionnaires after
deliberation.146 Perhaps unsurprisingly, all but one study has found that
larger juries deliberate longer than smaller juries.147 The mean time
difference for studies of actual juries (in contrast to mock juries) is fortyfour minutes.148 Only two studies compared the accuracy of recall of
evidence. These studies found that members of larger juries more
accurately recall evidence both during deliberation149 and in individual
recall afterwards.150
In a study published too late to be included in the meta-analysis,
Horowitz and Bordens assigned 567 jury-eligible men and women to sixand twelve-person juries, showed the juries a videotaped civil trial, and
asked the juries to deliberate to verdicts.151 The punitive awards of sixperson juries varied more than those of twelve-person juries.152 Twelveperson juries deliberated longer, recalled more probative information, and
relied less than six-person juries on evaluative statements and nonprobative evidence.153
Perhaps the most notable disadvantage of larger juries over smaller
juries is that talking time is more evenly divided among members of
smaller juries compared to larger juries—in larger juries, the talkative talk
even more and the less talkative talk even less.154 This very real

145. Williams, 399 U.S. at 100.
146. See generally Saks & Marti, supra note 138 (reviewing the studies of jury size).
147. This is significant at p < .05. See id. at 457–58.
148. Id. at 458.
149. p < .0001. Id. at 458–59.
150. p < .0001. Id.
151. Irwin A. Horowitz & Kenneth S. Bordens, The Effects of Jury Size, Evidence Complexity,
and Note Taking on Jury Process and Performance in a Civil Trial, 87 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 121,
124 (2002).
152. Id. at 126.
153. Id. at 126–27.
154. SAKS, supra note 114, at 11. One set of commentators has turned this finding into
something of a caricature of the deliberation, arguing that in twelve-person juries, but not in sixperson juries, the single voice of the foreperson dominates the group and its decision. Adam M.
Chud & Michael L. Berman, Six-Member Juries: Does Size Really Matter?, 67 TENN. L. REV. 743,
757 (2000). That is a misleading image of what takes place in juries. In decision-making groups,
including juries, even the single most talkative member is out-talked by the others, coalitions of
viewpoints form, and dissenters are not silenced but become the focus of discussion, are asked to
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disadvantage must nevertheless be balanced against the advantages of
larger juries: more total discussion, more vigorous and contentious
discussion, more human resources brought to the discussion, more
accurate recall of evidence, and (very likely) more stable and consistent
verdicts.
C. Ability of Jurors in the Minority to Resist Majority Pressure
On this question, the Williams Court purported to rely on a number of
studies to conclude that a juror or jurors holding views not shared by the
majority would be no more vulnerable to majority pressure in a jury of six
than in a jury of twelve.155 As discussed above, the Court misread those
studies as saying that the key to conformity pressure is in the ratio of the
size of the majority to the minority, when those studies in fact found
essentially the opposite: The absolute size of the dissenting
minority—most importantly, whether a dissenter had allies—was the
critical factor.156
If the basic research is correct, minority factions require at least two
jurors (each of whom has the other as an ally) if they are to withstand the
social pressure of the majority. All else equal, the rate of hung juries
would be greater in larger compared to smaller juries. The empirical
findings are consistent with this expectation: of the fifteen studies that lent
themselves to analysis of this question, results were in the expected
direction in eleven, and the overall result of the meta-analysis was highly
significant.157
An additional, more recent study by Limon and Boster looked at
minority views in relation to the majority in six- versus twelve-person
juries.158 In their examination of argument quality, minority size, and
influence of the majority, they concluded—consistent with the great bulk
of other research in this area—that a “minority that was large . . . was able
to influence the majority. Overall, having a large minority helps make the
minority subgroup more influential compared to a small minority.”159
Because the chance of minority members having allies is greater on a
twelve-person jury, more minority views will be represented and be able
to withstand majority pressure.
explain and defend their views, thus raising their talking quotient. Moreover, most presiding jurors
conduct themselves as facilitators of the deliberation, rather than as leaders of the substantive
debate, so that many of their verbalizations consist of procedural suggestions.
155. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 101–02 (1970).
156. See supra notes 103–06 and accompanying text.
157. p < .0018. Saks & Marti, supra note 138, at 459–61.
158. See M. Sean Limon & Franklin J. Boster, The Impact of Varying Argument Quality and
Minority Size on Influencing the Majority and Perceptions of the Minority, 49 COMM. Q. 350,
359–60 (2001).
159. Id. at 359.
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D. Factfinding Reliability
In discussing the effect that reduced jury size would have on trial
outcomes, the Williams Court concluded that jury size made no
difference, citing six irrelevant sources in support.160 Researchers cannot
say whether the result reached by a jury is correct or incorrect.
Researchers can, however, examine consistency in trial outcomes reached
by smaller versus larger juries. The operational definition used by the
meta-analysis, therefore, is that a group type (large versus small) is said
to be more consistent when more of its verdicts are in line with the
outcome preference of the grand total of all juries evaluating a given trial
(which is the best estimate of the total eligible population’s outcome
preference). Only mock jury studies lend themselves to this kind of
analysis because only these studies present the same trial to numerous
different juries.
Statistical theory predicts that conclusions will be more consistent
when generated by larger samples than by smaller samples. Social
psychological research and theory predict that increasing group size
improves group decisions up to the point where process inefficiencies
begin to detract more than the added human resources contribute; the
location of that tipping point depends on the kind of task the group
confronts.161 The jury deliberation task is of a kind that would be expected
to benefit from increases in size up to fairly large sizes.162 The empirical
studies reviewed by the meta-analysis tend in a direction consistent with
this prediction but do not reach statistical significance.163 So we cannot,
based on the studies included in the meta-analysis, say that verdicts are
more consistent when rendered by larger juries.
A study by Davis and his fellow researchers published too late to be
included in the meta-analysis found that six-person juries were generally
more inconsistent in their verdicts: in the civil context, smaller juries will
show more variability in their awards and will on average give larger
awards than twelve-person juries.164

160. See supra notes 94–102 and accompanying text.
161. See IVAN D. STEINER, GROUP PROCESS AND PRODUCTIVITY 67 (1972).
162. As explained in considerable detail in Steiner’s work, see id., increases in group size and
their concomitant resource advantages are partially offset by the gradually increasing complexity
of the group process required to incorporate the members’ resources into the group’s decisionmaking. At some point, the benefits brought by the next additional member are exceeded by the
additional organization burden. Eventually, the benefit of size peaks and the group process costs
exceed the benefit of the resources gained.
163. p = .261. Saks & Marti, supra note 138, at 461, 462 tbl.5.
164. James H. Davis et al., Effects of Group Size and Procedural Influence on Consensual
Judgments of Quantity: The Example of Damage Awards and Mock Civil Juries, 73 J. PERSONALITY
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Commentators sometimes argue for smaller juries on the grounds that
they will save money and time. Because cost and efficiency are irrelevant
to the constitutional analysis of the Sixth Amendment and are excluded
from the Court’s functional criteria in Williams, we discuss this issue only
in the margin.165
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 703, 707–08 (1997).
165. Efficiency plays no part in the analysis of jury functioning because it was not one of the
jury functions identified by the Supreme Court in Duncan or Williams. The reason is perhaps
obvious, though it has been articulated in numerous cases and contexts. See, e.g., Jones v. United
States, 526 U.S. 227, 246 (1999) (noting that delays or inconveniences are acceptable prices for a
fair jury system). The balance of cost versus fair trial always favors the latter. Efficiency and
inconvenience have no bearing on the interpretation of the Sixth Amendment:
Ultimately, our decision cannot turn on whether or to what degree trial by jury
impairs the efficiency or fairness of criminal justice. One can certainly argue that
both these values would be better served by leaving justice entirely in the hands
of professionals; many nations of the world, particularly those following civil-law
traditions, take just that course. There is not one shred of doubt, however, about
the Framers’ paradigm for criminal justice: not the civil-law ideal of
administrative perfection, but the common-law ideal of limited state power
accomplished by strict division of authority between judge and jury. . . .
. . . [T]he State should suffer the modest inconvenience of submitting its
accusation to “the unanimous suffrage of twelve of his equals and neighbours,”
rather than a lone employee of the State.
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 313–14 (2004) (citation omitted) (quoting WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES, *350).
Justice Scalia succinctly observed in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 498 (2000) (Scalia,
J., concurring), that efficiency was not important to the drafters of the jury trial guarantee: “The
founders of the American Republic were not prepared to leave it to the State, which is why the jurytrial guarantee was one of the least controversial provisions of the Bill of Rights. It has never been
efficient; but it has always been free.” The Arkansas Supreme Court likewise rejected the state’s
argument that twelve-person juries were simply not economical in misdemeanor cases: “A panel
of six jurors for misdemeanor trials may seem economical and, therefore, desirable at first blush
because less serious offenses are involved. However, many misdemeanors including the DWI
offense at hand are serious and carry with them maximum jail terms of one year and substantial
fines.” Byrd v. State, 879 S.W.2d 435, 438 (Ark. 1994). In the balance of interests, economic
desirability and efficient process must yield to defendants’ rights to a fair jury trial, particularly
when punishment ranges from maximum terms of five years to life in prison. See Jones, 526 U.S.
at 231–32, 246.
Nevertheless, consider some facts relevant to the cost efficiency argument. Forty-eight states
provide juries with more than six jurors in serious felony cases without an arduous burden falling
on those states’ citizens. In most of the United States, only 3%–5% of cases result in jury trials. In
Florida, fewer than 2% of felony cases go to trial. The Bureau of Justice Statistics has compiled
data on annual judicial expenditures and reported that Florida had a total combined budget for
circuit and county courts of $331 million, only a fraction of which is spent on juries. ROTTMAN &
STRICKLAND, supra note 4, at 83 tbl.17. Trial statistics by year and county are maintained by the
Florida State Courts. See Florida Trial Statistics, http://trialstats.flcourts.org/TrialCourtStats.aspx
(last visited Feb. 7, 2008). Based on statistics from 2004, 193,268 felony cases were filed. Only
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VII. CONCLUSION
In 1970 in Williams v. Florida, the U.S. Supreme Court found that the
minimum jury size under the U.S. Constitution could not be determined by
a plain reading of the Constitution. The intent of the Framers was
indiscernable. An unbroken line of previous Supreme Court cases reading
the jury requirement to mean twelve persons and more than 700 years of
common-law juries were of no consequence. Instead, said the Court, the
constitutionally permissible size of juries had to be determined through an
empirical test of the functional equivalence of juries smaller than twelve:
smaller juries that performed as well as twelve-person juries were to be
regarded as constitutional.
This Essay argues that the understanding and intent of the Framers can
be inferred from the long common-law history of the jury that was
accepted as sound by the Framers as well as from their unanimous
contemporary practice. For the Framers, a jury was synonymous with a
group of twelve, and therefore the Constitution requires a jury to be
composed of twelve persons.
If, however, the functional-equivalence test is the proper test, there
must be a meaningful burden to convincingly establish that a smaller-sized
jury is indeed the functional equivalent of a twelve-person jury. The
Williams Court did an astonishingly poor job in its analysis of those
facts—relying on non-studies, reading actual studies backwards, and
concocting speculative (and easily refuted) theories to conclude that six
equals twelve. A reexamination of the evidence originally invoked by
Williams coupled with subsequent research, much of which Justice
Blackmun cited in the lead opinion in Ballew v. Georgia, made clear that
six-person juries failed to perform as well as twelve-person juries on most
of the essential criteria specified by the Court.
Only eight years after Williams, the Ballew Court abandoned the
functional-equivalence test. The majority of Justices in Ballew made no
attempt to apply the test to Georgia’s five-person felony juries, and two of
the Justices concluded incomprehensibly that studies showing that sixperson juries were not equivalent to twelve-person juries indicated that
five-person juries “seriously impaired” the purpose and functioning of

3,681 cases went to jury trial. Of those 3,681 cases, 322 cases (3 were capital cases) were resolved
by plea (one can assume that at some point after jury selection the cases were resolved), an
additional 123 cases involved juries in capital cases, which are entitled to twelve-person juries
under current law. Excluding the capital cases, there were 3,555 felony jury trials in Florida.
Requiring twelve-person juries in these 1.8% of cases will not undermine judicial efficiency or
create excessive costs.
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juries in criminal trials “to a constitutional degree.”166 In place of the
functional-equivalence test, the Justices substituted their own naked
intuition that a six-person jury was the minimum size of a constitutional
jury. No legal authority, empirical evidence, or reasoning supported this
conclusion. It was pure ipse dixit. In this post-Ballew world, Williams is
no longer good law.
For this complex of reasons, no sound basis exists to determine the
constitutionally permissible minimum jury size. Williams, having become
a dead letter in Ballew, should either be ratified and the functionalequivalence test applied conscientiously or should be formally
reversed—allowing courts either to develop a sound theory of the
constitutionality of jury size or simply to restore the jury to the size that
had been recognized for 700 years of common-law history and 183 years
of U.S. constitutional history.

166. See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 239 (1978).
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